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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE 1\1:ATTER OF THE GEN-
ERAL DETERMINATION OF 
RIGHTS TO THE USE OF ALL 
WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, IN 
THE ESCALANTE VALLEY 
DRAINAGE AREA, 
In re: Water User's Claim No. 542, 
Underground Water Claim No. 
17173, R. L. Bradshaw Claimant, 
George C. Goodwin, Successor. 
GEORGE C. GOODWIN, 
Plaintiff a.nd Appellant, 
-vs.-
JOSEPH M. TRACY, State Engi-
neer of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case 
No. 8567 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State Engineer of the State of Utah, as the 
respondent herein, is in complete agreement with the 
statement of the case and the statement of facts as set 
forth in the brief of the appellant, but we do differ both 
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as to the materiality of those facts and as to the con-
clusions to be drawn therefrom; and, at the outset, we 
feel compelled to call the Court's attention to the fact 
that the respondent here has no personal or individual 
interest in the subject matter and is the respondent 
solely by reason of his official capacity. If this were 
a matter involving a surface stream, we are confident 
that there would be a considerable number of lower 
users who would be contesting this cause along with the 
present respondent. However, the water source here in-
volved is a rather large underground water basin and 
no one individual appears able to realize that every 
diversion therefrom, no matter how small, has some 
effect upon the water that will be available to him 
now and in the future. The District Court has, therefore, 
charged the office of the State Engineer with the defense 
of all matters of this kind in the area and this Court 
should view the problems here presented not in the 
light of the theory presented by the State Engineer as an 
abstract proposition but as an actual factual situation, 
the solution to which will have an immediate and substan-
tial impact upon several hundred water users in this 
area. 
We should also call the Court's attention to the fact 
that the interlocutory order of the trial court allowed 
the appellant the right to irrigate some 28 acres. The 
appellant claimed the right to irrigate about· 70 acres, 
but the respondent State Engineer took the position that 
the appellant had no right to irrigate any land and ""e 
shall hereafter demonstrate that not only can the judg-
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ment of the trial court be supported but the trial court 
actually went too far in allowing the 28 acres. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT THERE IS SPECIFIC STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY FOR THE STATE ENGINEER 
AND THE COURT TO LIMIT THE ACREAGE 
TO BE IRRIGATED FROM A WELL DRILLED 
PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE UN-
DERGROUND WATER LAW OF UTAH IN 
MARCH, 1935; AND THE CONTENTION OF 
THE RESPONDENT STATE ENGINEER 
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED 
TO NO IRRIGATION FROM SAID WELI.J 
WAS PROPER AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
UPHELD. 
POINT II 
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW THE 
CLAIMANT APPELLANT CAN BE LIMITED 
TO THE ACREAGE UNDER CULTIVATION 
IN 1942 AND THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN AWARDING THE 
CLAIMANT 28 ACRES IS PROPER AND IS 
ENTITLED TO AFFIRMANCE BY THIS 
COURT. 
POINT III 
THAT THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT WITH RESPECT TO APPLICATION 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THERE IS SPECIFIC STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY FOR THE STATE ENGINEER 
AND THE COURT TO LIMIT THE ACREAGE 
TO BE IRRIGATED FROM A WELL DRILLED 
PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE UN-
DERGROUND WATER LAW OF UTAH IN 
MARCH, 1935; AND THE CONTENTION OF 
THE RESPONDENT STATE ENGINEER 
THAT THE APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED 
TO NO IRRIGATION FROM SAID WELL 
WAS PROPER AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
UPHELD. 
Points I and II of the respondent's brief are directed 
at Point I, subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of appellant's 
brief but we have separated them for argument as we 
feel that this adds clarity to the problems that require 
the consideration of this Court. The questions of law here 
involved can best be arrived at by a chronological state-
ment of the statutes and the Yarious changes that have 
been 1nade and together 'Yith comment and citation of the 
cases that have been decided. 
We would at the outset state that the issue before 
this Court is simply whether the enactment of the under-
ground ''Tater la"T by the 1935 Legislature intended to 
retain the intent theory and permit enlargement of the 
underground "Tater right indefinitely until that intent 
had been accomplished or "Thether the legislature abol-
ished the intent theory and required all further enlarge-
ment of the right to be carried on under the supervision 
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and control of the State Engineer. We are convinced 
that the latter is the only correct theory and that, to give 
the legislative enactment any other construction, would 
lead to a most chaotic situation. 
In 1903, the Fifth Regular Session of the Utah Leg-
islature enacted what was designated as Chapter 100, 
consisting of 73 sections, and this was the first real \Vater 
code under \vhich water rights were initiated by applica-
tion to the State Engineer; and section 35 of this chapter 
provided that "any person, corporation or association, 
to hereafter acquire the right to the use of any public 
water in the State of Utah, shall before commencing the 
construction, enlargement or extension of any ditch, 
canal or other distributing works, or performing similar 
work tending to acquire the said right or appropriation, 
make an application in writing to the State Engineer, 
which shall include a map, profile and drawings, as here-
inafter provided.'' 
Section 72 of this same Chapter 100, Session Laws 
of Utah, 1903, provided for the repeal of all prior water 
laws and all other laws in conflict with this code, but it 
also provided as follows : '' ... but such repeal shall not 
affect any vested rights, and any person, corporation or 
association who may have heretofore filed notice of 
appropriation of water, or initiated any right under the 
provisions of said (repealed) laws, may complete and 
perfect such appropriation or right in the same manner 
and with like effect as if this repeal had not been 
m d " a e. . .. 
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We should also note that Section 34 of Chapter 100, 
Session Laws of Utah, 1903, reads as follows: ''Rights to 
the use of any of the unappropriated water in the State 
may be acquired by appropriation in the manner here-
inafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation 
must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, a!!d, as be-
t"reen appropriators, the one first in time shall be first 
in right.'' 
These sections became Sections 100-3-2 and 100-3-1, 
respectively, in the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and 
a careful comparison with that revision shows that no 
substantial changes in the above quoted portions 
had been made in either section during that thirty-
year period; and it should be here noted that no concept 
of state ownership or control of underground water had 
yet been promulgated, although by 1933 the cases of 
Wrathal v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755, and Jus-
tesen v. Olsen, 86 Utah 158, 40 P. 2d 802, were commenced 
and were on their way to this Court. And the decision of 
this Court in those two cases on January 2 and 10, 1935, 
respectively, made necessary the changes in the laws 
dealing with appropriation of water by the 1935 Legis-
lature. 
Section 100-3-1 of the 1933 Revised Laws was 
amended by Chapter 105 of the 1935 Session Laws to read 
as follows: 
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated public 
waters in this state may be acquired only as pro-
vided in this title. No appropriation of water may 
be made and no rights to the use thereof initiated 
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and no notice of ttntent to appropriate shall be rec-
ognized except application for such appropriation 
first be made to the state engineer in the manner 
hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The ap-
propriation must be for some useful and beneficial 
purpose, and, as between appropriators, the one 
first in time shall be first in right; provided, that 
when a use designated by an application to appro-
priate any of the unappropriated waters of the 
state would materially interfere with a more bene-
ficial use of such water, the application shall be 
dealt with as provided in section 100-3-8. '' 
This section has not since been changed except for the 
addition of the last sentence in the present section, which 
is now Section 73-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
sentence was added by the Session Laws of 1939 and deals 
with adverse use. 
The important change made in 1935 was the addi-
tion of the second sentence which has been italicized in 
the above quotation of the act and, for purposes of em-
phasis, may we point out that the legislature has said 
that "no notice of intent to appropriate shall be recog-
nized"; and this is clearly an indication that the old 
theory of a right to complete an appropriation based upon 
the intent when it was first begun was rejected by the 
legislature in favor of appropriation only under the su-
pervision and control of the State Engineer. 
Further, Section 100-3-2 of the Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, and the part with which we are concerned was 
amended by this same Chapter 105 of the 1935 Session 
Laws to read as follows : 
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"Any person who is a citizen of the United 
States, or who has filed his declaration of intention 
to become such as required by the naturalization 
laws, or any association of such citizens or declar-
ants, or any corporation, in order hereafter to 
acquire the right to the use of any unappropriated 
public water in this state shall, before commenc-
ing the construction, enlargement, extension or 
structural alteration of any ditch, canal, well, tun-
nel or other distributing works, or performing 
similar work tending to acquire such rights or ap-
propriation, or enlargement of an existing right 
or appropriation, make an application in writing 
to the state engineer.'' 
The remainder of this section, which is now Section 
73-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, has since been 
changed in some detail, but the part above quoted has 
since remained the law and we desire to call attention 
specifically to the words contained in the last three lines 
above quoted, and, at the risk of repetition but in order 
to emphasize their importance in this issue, we again 
quote them as follows : 
''or enlargement of an existing right or appro-
priation make an application in writing to the 
state engineer.'' 
Applying these statutes to the facts in the present 
ease, "re find that the clai1nant appellant had drilled a 
well in 1934 but had made no use thereof prior to the 
enactment of the aboYe quoted acts in 1935 and their 
effeetiYe date of l\Iarch ~~' 1935 ~ and the State Engi-
neer has taken the position that the acts above quoted 
requi r<.\d that this claimant file an application before he 
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had any right to the use of ,,.a ter from this well for any 
irrigation purpose, as such use would clearly be an "en-
largement of an existing right or appropriation.'' We 
respectfully urge that this language of the statute, cou-
pled with the clear and announced purpose of the legis-
lature to reject and abolish the theory of intent as applied 
to the appropriation of water, specifically provides the 
procedure that must be followed by a water claimant and 
conclusively demonstrates that the position taken by the 
State Engineer in completely disallowing the claim 
vYas sound and proper and the only position consistent 
·with the statute that could be taken. 
This case is a matter of first import in this state and 
is of great importance not only to the office of the State 
Engineer but to all owners of water rights from under-
ground sources. The State Engineer is most concerned 
as this Court's decision vvill directly affect the action of 
that office in all adjudication proceedings now under way 
and those to be undertaken in the future. And each 
owner of a right to use water from underground sources 
is interested either as he may or may not be given the 
right to use more water and enlarge upon his right or as 
he may find the water in his particular area protected 
from further withdrawals or be subject to further deple-
tion as the case may be. 
The only case decided since 1935 touching upon this 
subject is Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P. 
2d 255, and in this case the Court said: 
"We, therefore, conclude and hold that the right 
to the use of underground waters which prior 
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to the Wrathall case were not considered the 
subject of an appropriation, but which were there-
in held to be subject thereto, could be acquired 
prior to the 1935 enactments and amendments of 
our statutes on that subject by merely diverting 
such waters from their natural source and placing 
them to a beneficial use and that the plaintiff had, 
prior to the filing of the application of the city 
with the State Engineer, acquired a vested right 
to the use of the waters flowing from his well to 
the extent that he had placed them to a beneficial 
use as hereinbefore indicated, and that by filing 
his claim to such right to use such waters in ac-
cordance with the 1935 statute he has established 
that right with a priority dating from his first 
use.'' 
The statement of the Court in this case limiting the 
right to the extent of the beneficial use made before the 
effective date of the 1935 amendment is clearly in accord 
with the position now taken by the State Engineer that 
there could be no enlargement of any ''existing right or 
a ppropria.tion'' after the 1935 amendment unless a 
proper written application was made to the State 
Engineer. 
Some contention has and will be made that we are 
attempting to apply this 1935 amendment retroactively 
and that we are attempting to deprive this claimant of a 
vested right. This is not so. In the first instance the stat-
utes above quoted are procedural in nature and are 
intended to provide for proper administration and distri-
bution of water in this state to the end that there may 
be a better beneficial use thereof by all concerned. And, 
secondly, may \v·e call attention to the fact that on March 
10 
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22, 1935, every underground water user was given a full 
right to the extent of his beneficial use on that date. N oth-
ing was taken from him; but he was thereafter required 
to make proper application to the State Engineer if he 
desired to enlarge upon his right, which is in reality a ne,~.r 
appropriation. 
And in futher support of our conention may we quote 
Section 73-5-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which sec-
tion was first enacted by the 1935 legislature as a part of 
the then new underground water code, and which reads 
as follows: 
''Within one year after the date of the approval 
of this act, all cla.iman.ts to rights to the use of 
underground waters shall file notice of such claim 
or claims, with the state engineer on forms fur-
nished by him, setting forth such information as 
the state engineer may require, including but not 
limited to the following: 
The name and postoffice of the person making 
the claim; the location .of the well or tunnel or 
other means of diversion with reference to a Unit-
ed States government survey corner; the nature 
and extent of use on which claim of appropriation 
is based ; the flow of underground water used in 
cubic feet per second or the quantity in acre-feet; 
the time during which underground water has 
been used each year and the date when under-
ground water was first used. 
Failure to file notice of claim or claims, as pro-
vided in this section, shall be prima facie evidence 
of intent to abandon such claimed right or rights, 
and in the distribution of the underground waters 
of this state, the state engineer may disregard 
any claim not so filed. ' ' 
11 
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In connection with this section, we have italicized cer-
tain words and phrases that again preclude any thought 
that the claimant had any unlimited time in which to com-
plete his appropriation; and, certainly, the fact that he 
\Vas to file within the year a statement of his claim can 
have no significance and no meaning if that same claim-
ant were entitled to an additional :fifteen years, as claimed 
by the present appellant, to complete his appropriation 
and fulfill what he claims to have been his original 
intention. 
And, finally, in connection with this matter, may we 
reiterate that in 1903 the legislature specifically provided 
for completion and perfection of rights that had there-
tofore been initiated \Yithout compliance with the water 
code then enacted. No similar provision is contained in 
the 1935 act and we believe that this is a. complete answer 
to appellant's statement on page 21 of his brief and is 
again conclusive proof that it \Yas the legislative inten-
tion to require all use of water from that date on to be 
under the supervision and control of the State Engineer. 
At this point "Te "~ould refer the Court to the Pro-
posed Determination of Water Rights in the Esc-alante 
Valley Drainage Area \Yhich \Yas filed \Yith the District 
Court in Iron County on ~\._pril 1, 1949, and which is a 
part of the record in this cause. Contained \vithin this 
I>ropoHed Dt~termination and cominencing on page 204 
a11d concluding on page 269 are listed the rights to the 
use of und0rground \Ynter that \Yere initiated prior to 
1935. It haH bet)u computed that the total of these rights 
12 
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is for the irrigation of 6300 acres with a right of with-
drawal of 107 second-feet of water. The right here claimed 
of 1.0 second-foot to irrigate 70 acres seems small in com-
parison, but becomes of considerable magnitude when one 
considers that there are a considerable number of water 
users, each of whom seek by similar protest, the right to 
enlarge over the use that existed in 1935. 
There is in the present matter before the Court no 
complaint by any junior appropriator or any other user 
of water within this underground area as to this claimed 
right to enlarge his use by the appellant herein; but the 
State Engineer believed, and the District Court confirmed 
this belief into a fact, that in these general adjudication 
proceedings, and particularly where underground water 
was concerned and a contest has developed, the State En-
gineer not only represents the State of Utah but of ne-
cessity represents all other 'vater claimants in the area. 
VVe are required to take and defend such a position as 
the claimants within the area expect that we will defend 
and uphold the Proposed Determination as presented and 
we are also vitally interested in all matters of this type 
inasmuch as the final ruling will do much to determine 
the existence or non-existence of unappropriated water 
within the source. 
The cases of Becker v. Marble Creek Irrigation Co., 
15 Utah 225, 49 Pac. 892, Hague v. Nephi Irrigation Co., 
16 Utah 421, 52 Pac. 765, Gunnison Irrigation. Co. v. Gun-
nison Highland Ca;nal Co., 52 Utah 347, 174 Pac. 852 and 
Jensen v. Birch Creek Ranch, 76 Utah 356, 289 Pac. 1097, 
13 
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are each discussed under Point II of this brief, but we 
feel that the language used and hereafter quoted in those 
cases is equally applicable to the matters herein discussed 
and we earnestly hope that this Court will so consider it. 
And, in conclusion of this part of the argument, may 
we refer to the recent case of Bishop v. Duck Creek Irri-
ga.tion Co., 121 Utah 290, 241 P. 2d 162. In that case the 
proof available went back only to 1906 and the court 
accepted such use and adjudicated the rights based on 
such use. No reference was made to any right of en-
largement or to any reasonable period therefor, but this 
Court did make this statement: "Since there are no fil-
ings with the State Engineer either by Bishop or his pre-
decessors, whatever right he has to the water must 
necessarily rest upon appropriation by beneficial use 
before 1903. Prior to that time the law allowed appro-
priation by such use, and statutes enacted that year pre-
serve such appropriations.'' 
POINT II 
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW THE 
CLAIMANT APPELLANT CAN BE LIMITED 
TO THE ACREAGE UNDER CULTIVATION 
IN 1942 AND THE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN AWARDING THE 
CLAIMANT 28 ACRES IS PROPER AND IS 
ENTITLED TO AFFIRMANCE BY THIS 
COURT. 
The matters discussed under this point would be-
come moot if the Court were to agree "~ith the position 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
taken by the respondent under Point I, but we also 
earnestly contend and urge that the decision of the Dis-
trict Court can and should be upheld without regard to 
Point I as far as the Appellant is concerned although 
the acreage so allowed is contrary to the position taken by 
respondent and in excess of that which which the re-
spondent believes should have been allowed. 
We believe it patently unfair to the trial court to 
assume that he chose a seven-year period as a reasonable 
time to call a halt to further enlargements solely because 
the State Engineer had surveyed the acreage in question 
at the end of such period. The trial court had before him 
not only the protest of this claimant appellant but a con-
siderable number of other protests from other water 
users within the area covered by the Proposed Determi-
nation and he had before him that Proposed Determina-
tion which constituted an exhaustive survey and compila-
tion of all water rights in the area; and these matters, 
coupled with the known reluctance both then and now of 
State Engineers to approve applications in this under-
ground area because of the belief that the area may be 
overappropriated, would in and of themselves furnish 
sufficient grounds to support the trial court's finding 
that a seven-year period was a sufficiently long period in 
which the appellant should and must have completed his 
original intention. To hold otherwise in an area where 
the development was proceeding at a rapid pace and 
where a great number of other water users were also 
involved, would be to invite chaos and confusion. 
15 
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This Court has many times stated and held that it 
will not on appeal disturb the findings of the trial court 
if there is any substantial evidence supporting those find-
ings ; and we believe that this statement is the more com-
pelling when the decision of the trial court concerns the 
question of the reasonableness of a particular matter or 
thing. This Court has on many occasions stated that the 
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the findings of trial court and two of the latest cases so 
stating and holding are Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d, 127, 
262 P. 2d 760, and Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 
4 Utah 2d. 181, 290 P. 2d 689. And for these compelling 
reasons, Finding No. 2 by the trial court is proper and it 
and the conclusion that it supports are entitled to affirm-
ance by this Court. It appears proper to comment here 
that what might be a reasonable time to complete an 
appropriation in an area where development was slow 
and the area isolated and the water users few, could very 
well be an unreasonable time in an area of large devel-
opment by a great number of water users; and the Mil-
ford underground 'vater basin is a small area that has 
had a large development by many ,,~ater users. 
There ha Ye been no cases decided b~~ this Court that 
have specifically covered this question of a reasonable 
time for development eYen under the surface "Tater 
rights, but \Ye are con,~inred that the cases cited under 
Point I on page 13 of this brief are most indicatiYe of 
th(_i vie\Y thnt has been taken and are most compelling 
as to the ruling that ought to be made. The early case of 
Becke1· r. 1ll arble Creek Irrigation Co., supra, decided in 
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1897, is of the utmost importance, and in that case this 
Court said: 
"The waters of a prior appropriator are fixed 
by the extent of his appropriation for a beneficial 
use, and others may subsequently appropriate any 
water of a stream not so used by a prior appro-
priator; and such latter appropriation becomes a 
vested right, and entitled to as much protection 
as the former, and a right of which he cannot be 
deprived except by voluntary alienation, or for-
feiture by abandonment. The rights of the former 
being thus fixed, he cannot enlarge his rights to 
the detriment of the latter by increasing his de-
mands, or by extending his use to other lands, even 
if used for a beneficial purpose.'' 
One year later in 1898, the case of Hague v. Nephi 
Irrigation Co., supra, was decided by this Court and the 
following quotation, although somewhat lengthy, so 
clearly states the proposition for which we are contending 
that 've are compelled to quote it: 
"The object and intention, under the law, in di-
verting water, must be to apply it to some useful 
purpose, and if by means of ditches more is di-
verted than is necessary for such purpose, the 
excess cannot be regarded as a diversion for a 
useful purpose; for, as matter of fact, such 
excess merely runs to waste, and its diver-
sion cannot result in a vested right. If, there-
fore, A., who owns and intends to irrigate 
but one acre of land, diverts all the water 
of a natural stream, which is sufficient to irrigate 
two acres, he obtains a right only to sufficient 
water to irrigate his one acre, and B., who also 
owns an acre, may appropriate the excess. If, in 
this arid region, the law were otherwise, it would 
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be a menace to the best interests of the state as 
well as to its citizens, because it would enable a 
few individuals, or association of individuals, by 
diversion of water in excess of use, to greatly 
limit the area of the public domain which could 
be cultivated, and thus deprive the state of its 
revenue, and citizens of homes within its borders. 
This is exemplified in the case at bar, where 19 
families settled upon public lands, and are now 
represented as then having, in cultivating a com-
paratively few acres of land, diverted all the water 
of the stream, which was then and is now sufficient 
to irrigate thousands of acres, and to supply the 
inhabitants of the city of Nephi with water for 
culinary and domestic purposes. No such extrava-
gance in the use of water was ever intended by the 
enactment of the laws relating to the appropria-
tion and use of water in the arid belt of the coun-
try. The extent of the appropriation is limited, no 
matter how much water may have been diverted, 
to the quantity necessary for the purposes for 
which the appropriation is made, and the inten-
tion to apply it to some useful purpose, without 
unnecessary delay, must also appear, in order to 
confer upon the appropriator a vested right there-
to. If there is no intention, on the part of the 
appriator, to apply the water to such purpose, 
within a. reasonable time, there is no valid appro-
priation, and the 'Yater remains subject to appro-
priation by otheas. So, where there is more 
diverted than is necessary for the object of the 
appropriation, there can be no intention to apply 
the excess to a useful purpose, and such excess re-
mains subject to appropriation. In Kin. Irr. S. 
150, it is said: 'This intention goes to the very 
foundation of the art of appropriation, and must 
be evidenced by a constancy, or steadfastness of 
purpose or labor, as is usual with men engaged in 
like enterprises, 'vho desire a speedy accomplish-
18 
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ment of their designs.' In Ortma.n v. Dixon, 13 
Cal. 34, it was said: 'The measure of the right, as 
to extent, follows the nature of the appropriation 
or the uses for which it is taken. The intent to 
take and appropriate the outward act go together. 
If we concede that a man has right by mere pri-
ority to take as much water from a running stream 
as he chooses, to be applied to such purposes as he 
pleases, the question still arises, what did he 
choose to take f And this depends upon the gen-
eral and particular uses he makes of it. If, for in-
stance, a man takes up water to irrigate his 
meadow at certain seasons, the act of appropria-
tion ,the means used to carry out the purpose, and 
the use made of the water should qualify his right 
of appropriation to a taking for a specific purpose, 
and limit the quantity to that purpose, or so much 
as necessary for it.' So in Canal Co. v. Kidd, 37 
Cal. 282, Mr. Chief Justice Sawyer, after refer-
ence to a number of cases, observed: 'The doctrine 
is that no man shall act upon the principle of the 
dog in the manger, by claiming water by certain 
preliminary acts, and from that moment prevent 
others from enjoying that which he is himself un-
able or unwilling to enjoy, and thereby prevent 
the development of the resources of the country 
by others. Anybody else may divert and use all 
the water, be it more or less, that a prior claim-
ant is not in a present condition to use, and, by 
lack of diligence on his part in pursuing a per-
fecting a prior inchoate right, many acquire rights 
even superior to his.' Kin. Irr. pp. 151, 1953; Mo-
Kinney v. Smith, 21 Cal. 37 4; Combs v. Ditch Co., 
17 Colo. 146, 28 Pac. 966; Macris v. Bicknell, 7 
Cal. 262; Water Co. v. Powell, 34 Cal. 110; Simp-
son v. Williams, 18 Nev. 432, 4 Pac. 1213." 
In Gunnison Irrigation Co. v. Gunnison Highla;nd 
Canal Co., supra, this statement was made: 
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''In short, the rights of a prior appropriator are 
measured and limited by the extent of his appro-
priation and application to a beneficial use. If he 
diverts more water than under this doctrine he is 
entitled to, he must return such surplus to the 
stream for the use of subsequent appropriators. 
No extension or enlargement of his rights as deter-
mined by the doctrine of beneficial use can be 
made so as to interfere with the vested rights of 
others.'' 
And in Jensen v. Birchr Creek Ranch, supra., this 
Court said: 
"It is also the settled law in this jurisdiction 
that a prior appropriator of water from a natural 
stream may not so increase his demand and use 
of the water appropriated by him as to deprive a 
subsequent appropriator of any right which he 
may have acquired before such increased demand 
and use is made by a prior appropriator." 
The above language is particularly appropriate with re-
spect to the issues no"'" before this Court. 
The appellant has laid considerable stress upon the 
failure of the State Engineer to lapse applications even 
though there may have been as much as t\Yenty years 
elapse since the actual filing of the application. We would 
urge upon the Court that the difference bet,veen a con-
trolled and superYised procedure under an application 
and the unlimited, uncontrolled and unbounded right as 
c1nimed by the nppellant is so great as to compel the con-
clusion that there can be and should be no attempt at 
comparison. To state the proposition is to answer it. 
Under appellant's theory, the amount of water he claims 
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a right to pump from the well, the period during which 
he claims a right of use and the total acreage he claims a 
right to irrigate are tightly locked within his mind to be 
revealed only when his full intention has been accom-
plished. It is indeed impossible to show a similarity be-
tween that approach and the orderly procedure under an 
application, which in and of itself declares the limit be-
yond which the appropriator may not enlarge and which 
requires either proof of appropriation at the end of a 
specified period or a request for an extension of time 
based upon an affidavit that the statute intends should 
show a diligent effort towards completion of the appro-
priation. If the State Engineer is too lax in permitting 
extensions, other water users in the area have an absolute 
right to take the initiative under Section 73-3-13, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which section has been the law 
since 1919 and reads as follows : 
'' .. A.ny other applicant or any user of water from 
any river system or water source may protest 
to the state engineer that such work is not being 
diligently prosecuted to completion, whereupon 
the state engineer shall give the applicant doing 
such work or his assigns sixty days' notice by 
registered mail to his last recorded address to 
appear on a date to be designated and show cause, 
if any he has, why his application shall not be 
declared forfeited in whole or in part, and on such 
date such applicant or his assigns shall be per-
mitted to produce any lawful evidence tending to 
sho'v compliance on his part with the law. At 
such hearing the state engineer may hear and con-
sider any and all competent evidence tending to 
show whether or not the applicant or his assigns 
have complied with the law. If diligence is not 
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shown by the applicant the state engineer may 
declare the application and all rights thereunder 
forfeited. The decision of forfeiture shall be final 
unless an action to review it is filed as provided 
by section 73-3 ... 14." 
We submit that, except as the action of the trial 
court exceeds what the respondent believes to be the law 
as set forth in Point I, the findings and conclusions of the 
trial court are proper, are fully supported both by the 
facts and by the law and should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THAT THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT WITH RESPECT TO APPLICATION 
NO. 11870 IS PROPER AND SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
Appellant discusses this matter under his Point 1-d 
and in effect says that he has been misled by the actions 
and interpretations of the State Engineer to his damage 
and that he should be made whole. In answer to this con-
tention we would first say that, if the Court were to find 
that this was true, we would greatly prefer that any 
award to this appellant be made in this manner, as we 
are fully and firmly convinced that to allow the appellant 
any relief in any other manner does violence to the stat-
utes and to the cases that we have cited; and we earnestly 
hope that this Court agrees with our conclusion in this 
respect. But we are not convinced that there was any 
misleading as it clearly appears to us that all of the 
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known facts were equally known both to the water users 
and to the State Engineer at all times. We would spe-
cifically refer to Conclusion No. 3 made by the trial court 
in this matter and also to page 12 of appellant's brief; 
and it would appear that the belief of the then State En-
gineer in 1935 that there was no unappropriated water 
and the reversal of that belief by a later State Engineer 
in about the year 1944 were both widely communicated 
to all water users within the area. Each user had similar 
and identical facts before him and to hold that one was 
misled would compel a conclusion that all were so misled; 
and this is, of course, not correct. It would appear that 
the correct conclusion is that the appellant in this matter 
failed to exercise proper diligence both in his initial de-
velopment and in not protecting himself with a proper 
application following the change in practice in 1944. 
CONCLUSION 
The State Engineer did not appeal from the decision 
of the District Court even though that holding was in a 
way contrary to the position taken by the State Engineer 
in that court as set out under Point I of this brief; but 
we urge upon this Honorable Court that the decision of 
the District Court should be affirmed for the reasons we 
have set forth under either Point I or Point II of this 
brief. With respect to the position of the appellant under 
his Point 1-d and our answer under Point III of this brief, 
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we urge that this Court give due consideration to the 
matters submitted and exercise its sound discretion in 
arriving at a conclusion. 
Respectfully submitted: 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
ROBERT B. PORTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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